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Introduction
This paper's goal is to regard the methodological prescription of the Eudemian Ethics 1 I 6 and its relationship with Allan's quasi-mathematical thesis -which draws Aristotle nearer to Euclid's methodwhile also presenting Karbowski's objections to Allan. Moreover, I will also expound Karbowski's theory, which holds that it is possible to read book II in the light of prescription I 6, always going through the vaguest opinions and definitions first only then to the most precise.
Let us observe here how Aristotle prescribes his method in the sixth chapter of the first book of the Eudemian Ethics:
[1] We must try, by argument, to reach a convincing conclusion on all these questions, using, as testimony [marturios] and by way of example [paradeigmasi] , what appears to be the case [phainomenois] .
[2] For it would be best if everyone should to turn out to agree with what we are going to say; if not that, that they should all agree in a way and will agree after a change of mind; [3] for each man has something of his own to contribute to the finding of truth, and it is from such [starting points] that we must demonstrate: [4] beginning with things that are correctly said, but not clearly, as we proceed we shall come to express them clearly, with what is more perspicuous at each stage superseding what is customarily expressed in a confused fashion.
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The philosopher tries to define in the first sentence how one should precisely guide oneself in order to get to the truth on moral matters or, at least, to clearer concepts. Employing indications is using the endoxa as a starting point, which will be cleared up, in order to have premises or hypotheses used as "models" of the investigation. The second assertion then seems to justify the first, for "it would be best if everyone should to turn out to agree", meaning that it will be easier to establish the endoxa (which are the reputed opinions) as models, making the first reputed opinions survey already seen as a group itself. If that isn't the case, Aristotle goes on: since all men cling to truth -assertion which seems to be the basis of his argument -, one only needs to then prove whatever it is that each one of us can contribute: that is, reputed opinions. In a way, these opinions would already be indications but not models, since they would not have been clarified yet. That is the point when, once more, one has the need to go through the aporiai so as to establish a consistent group and to finally prove what is that something each person has to "contribute to the finding of truth". This should be conforming the initial indications from which one has begun, the nonclarified endoxa, to the established models or paradigms through the enlightenment of the endoxa. One must observe and reach out for patters within the indications as to only then be able to confront them and 1 I will use the abreviation of Ethica Eudemia as EE and Ethica Nicomachea as NE. to clarify one's opinions. Mansion 3 proposes an important distinction for the forth assertion: a distinction between the investigation's starting point and knowledge stricto sensu. The first would be the "more understandable to us" (that is, to the observer) whereas the latter would be "more understandable in itself"
(that is, due to the nature of the object's knowledgeability). The interpreter highlights an aspect of this distinction in the process of understanding by asserting that "an immediate evidence that imposes itself is more understandable for us, but which doesn't fully satisfy our spirit in such a way that it excited us to proceed investigating" (1979, p. 213-4) Following this interpretation, the endoxa might be taken as to be indications because they are the most understandable for us and, since they are so, they become the starting points of our investigation, which usually goes through the particulars first and then to the universal.
The Endoxa Method
If book I does in fact confirm itself as a preamble to what will be investigated and if the "endoxa method" is a correct procedure that Aristotle recommends at the beginning of the treatise, one may hold Barnes' thesis, which presents the endoxa as the components of the Eudemian Ethics' method from the beginning until the end of its definitional quest. Let us now take a look at what such procedure consists of.
At the beginning of the akrasia discussion in the Ethica Nicomachea VII 1 (=EE VI 1), Aristotle prescribes the following:
We must, as in all other cases, set the apparent facts before us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all common opinions about these affections of the mind, or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative (...).
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I will presuppose his analysis on the interchangeability between the phainomena and the endoxa in such a way that one may read "set the apparent facts" as an opinion survey on the matter. It is also shall be two moments in which one grasps the reputed opinions: the first would be when one gathers these opinions, which I will here name as "preliminary endoxa" due to the fact that they may present inconsistencies in such a way that they could not all form a group, since a group must be consistent.
Secundo, after going through the aporiai, one shall have enlightened endoxa, meaning that they form a group which indicates to the investigator how to proceed next. This preliminary survey of reputed opinions (which dispute the status of truth and are usually in contradiction) will generally take one to a confusing and puzzling path meant to be gone through. With that said, the process of going through aporias mentioned in the passage above becomes clearer and reveals itself as aspiring to preserve the most compatible endoxa as possible, thus forming a consistent group. This will be accomplished through the analyses of the preliminary endoxa and the incompatibilities that show up -for example, in the akrasia discussion in the Ethica Nicomachea, Aristotle points out inconsistencies that derive from Socrates' opinions only to later establish which opinions he can keep or modify. Now I pass on to step three, (3) "proving the opinions as much as possible". This is the result which came from "going through the aporiai" and reformulating the reputed opinions so as to finally obtaining a consistent group. Barnes 7 identifies that the notion of "proof" is a kind of problem solving that the initial endoxa survey produced. He stresses that truth is exclusive and exhaustively found in the remain group of reputed opinions. It seems that it is an exhaustive process because the endoxa form a maximally consistent group, meaning that adding any other opinion would make them inconsistent -thus no longer a group. Nonetheless, how can we understand Barnes when he states that truth must be found exclusively through the remaining group of reputed opinions? I am convinced that an Eudemian Ethics passage can be useful to make the procedure's last step comprehensible.
Looking back at the EE I 6 prescription, we can better understand how what was taken as being the investigation's starting point actually works within the "endoxa method". In 1216b28, Aristotle says that "for each man has something of his own to contribute to the finding of truth". As previously exposed, this "thing" everyone can contribute to truth and that needs to be proved is the reputed opinions. In the Ethica Nicomachea VII 1 (EE = VI 1), this is also required. What is proven is not that the truth is the end of the definitional quest, nor that it is a definitive proof given to an argument, but that it is a proof that one already in a consistent a properly philosophical group; by properly philosophical I mean that the endoxa can now be properly used for the definitional quest: the endoxa are thus both the investigation's own elements and its starting point.
Book II -Allan's thesis on the "quasi-mathematical" method
After having endorsed that the procedure in I 6 is based on the refinement and the conformity of the endoxa, which serves as the Eudemian Ethics' prescription throughout, which this paper's hypothesis, one begins to read book II with an odd impression.
In II 1, Aristotle first says that what he shall present comes from reputed opinions ("For wisdom, virtue and pleasure are either in the soul or outside it, and it is those in the soul that are more worthy of choice" 1218b35) and by inductions alike ("Let this be assumed; and about excellence, that it is the best disposition, state, or capacity of anything that has some employment or function." 1219a1-20).
Nonetheless, the hypotheses introduced throughout the chapter look more like postulations, for they are not previously examined as endoxa should and they aren't introduced as being the opinions of the wise or of the majority. Allan 8 also notices that in this passage he seems to use an Euclidean method in which "references assumptions or vague initial definitions". Allan gives away examples that corroborate to his assertion by briefly rebuilding Aristotle's definitional investigation on eudaimonia -going through areté (hypothesis 2, 1218b37) and ergon's definitions first -, even after it had already been identified as being Besides shedding an Euclidian strategy upon Aristotle, Allan also finds similarities between the way Aristotle uses terms that introduce hypotheses and definitional derivations, as hupokeisthō and estō 10 , which he presumes were terms of the mathematical context. These similarities are not conclusive though.
Karbowski 11 takes advantage of this non-conclusive fact and asserts that these terms were already broadly used by philosophers of Aristotle's time and before, including himself. Nonetheless, this is not enough to
give up on Allan's theory: Aristotle may have well made use of mathematics' technicality and methodological strategy in his works, thus formulating a deductive structure alongside its closest terms:
that is, the mathematical terms.
Karbowski's Critique of Allan
Karbowski does not identify the passage in which Allan does not rebuild differently than I 6 prescribes (thus subsidized by Barnes' thesis on the compatibility of the endoxa). 2. Good/ends in the soul are best among human goods.
3. Therefore, happiness must be a good (the best good) in the soul.
4. Goods in the soul are either states or activities.
5. Activities are better than states, and the best activity is correlated with the best state.
6. Therefore, happiness must be the best activity in the soul, the one correlated with the best state.
7. The best state of the soul is its excellence.
8. Therefore, happiness is the activity of the good, i.e.: excellent, soul. 4. Virtue of character is concerned with pleasures and pain.
5. Therefore, virtue of character is a mean state and is concerned with the mean (relative to us) to pleasures and pains.
Karbowski holds and presents these methodological steps, being all of them relevant to the I 6 prescription and containing premises (except the second) which can be found in previous discussions in the text. Aristotle introduces the first premise induced by given examples
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. Then, the second premise isn't a reputed opinion nor is it derived from the first premise, so being simply introduced and then secured by the third premise, which appeals "as much to the induction as to the rational argument" to Allan, nothing more. When looking to Karbowski's view, though, one notices that they are part of the discussion and are introduced from the most vague to the clearer thoughts of the public to only then obtain a definition that is enlightened and not obvious, respecting the I 6 prescription.
Final considerations: rebuilding Allan's thesis
Even though he doesn't really identify the use of mathematical elements in Aristotle's EE, Karbowski admits that it was deliberately used and was acknowledged by Aristotle. The author brings forth an example from the EE (IV) or EN (V):
The just then is a species of the proportionate (proportion being not a property only of the kind of number which consists of abstract units, but of number in general). For proportion is equality of ratios, and involves four terms at least (that discrete proportion involves four terms is plain, but so does continuous proportion, for it uses one term as two and mentions it twice; e.g.: 'as the line A is to the line B, so will C to D, and therefore, alternando, as A is to C, B will be to D. Therefore, also the whole is in the same ratio to the whole; and the distribution pairs them in this way, and if they are so combined, pairs them justly. This passage is one of the hardest to understand and I find myself limited to say that it's about distributive justice. In short, the idea is that a just distribution of goods is proportional to each person's merits. Karbowski points out three of the passage's mathematical aspects on ethics: (1) Aristotle deliberately holds that the extension of the concept of proportion (analogy) within ethic matters: this means that it is applied in situations that go beyond the dominium of abstract objects and numbers (including concrete magnitudes and political goods). (2) In 1131b6-7 Aristotle uses the term "alternando"
as having the following meaning: four proportional magnitudes (A is to B what C is to D) are also alternately proportional. (3) Aristotle explicitly refers to mathematicians in 1131b12-3 and even uses the term "geometrical", which was thought as a mathematical one, to make reference to the proportion in question 22 .
Karbowski's conclusion is that, though Allan isn't right to be certain that Aristotle uses consciously "a mathematical pattern of deduction" in the EE, the Stagerite certainly was aware of mathematical patterns in other contexts. Karbowski suggests that what we can learn by the passages in which Aristotle uses mathematical terms is properly that he uses an analytic method, and not a deductive one, which is used to discover the elements involved in a proof. This analysis 23 can be described as the method which begins with someone trying to find (to zetoumenon) in a certain time (t1); having this established in a (t2), it is added to the investigation while someone looks back on what was known in (t1) and that can occasionally be derived. in themselves).
In order to conclude, I shan't try to restrain the use of the quasi-mathematical term in the Eudemian Ethics, but only try to show that Allan's interpretation looks only towards one direction and is thus liable to not address important aspects of the method, as the I 6 prescription and the idea of passing from the vaguest to the most precise when dealing with definitions. Aristotle uses postulates, but one must keep in mind that they were broadly used as archai or logos in Aristotle's historical context and that one should so delimitate its use. Karbowski holds that this use was associated to the necessity of dissociating postulates from first principles of moral's dominium, apart from following the criteria of the I 6 prescription.
By following the prescription's criteria, Karbowski refers to the continuity of the I 6 passage that was not here quoted, which consists on deepening the previous prescriptions:
For that way of proceeding is the philosopher's, in every discipline,; but great care is needed here. For, it appears to be the mark of the philosopher never to speak in an unconsidered fashion, but always with reason, there are some that go undetected when they produce arguments that are foreign to the inquiry and idle.
(They do this sometimes because of ignorance, sometimes because of charlatans.) By such arguments are caught even by those who are experienced and of practical ability at the hands of men who neither have or are capable of architectonic or practical thought. This happens to them through lack of training; for it is a lack of training to be unable to distinguish, in regard to each subject, between those arguments which are appropriate to it and those which are foreign. It is also a good thing to appraise separately the account of Aristotle's concern with the first principles of the moral domain separately from its postulates. The same kind of separation is what's at stake here. Answering the second, I cannot see a necessary connection with the postulate-use, but only that a postulate could in this case regulate its object beforehand so that it isn't too far off from the field of analysis.
Given the theses and passages analyzed, we can conclude, according to Karbowski's criticisms of Allan's thesis, that Eudemian Ethics does not seem to follow the Euclidian method, for Aristotle's method, although somewhat similar, follows opposite directions as far as which does not postulate its definitions, but part of what is most familiar to us to arrive at more refined premises and their conclusions. Moreover, neither is the method "quasi-mathematical" in the sense that Allan attributes to it: it can only be said quasi-mathematical insofar as the arguments may resemble mathematical proofs, but in relation to the terms employed. These terms which Allan judges to be unique to the mathematics of the time, but which Karbowski shows are jargon used very freely in various areas of knowledge. Thus, it is only in a very vague sense in which the Eudemian Ethics can be said to be quasi-mathematical, although it does retain similarities with mathematics through its proofs. But this is not enough to say that the method prescribed in I 6 is discrepant of the definitional process of book II. Thus, we must conclude that Allan's thesis draws attention to interesting aspects of the second book, but that it is not consistent in his conclusion to hold that Aristotle is following a method different from what was presented in the prescription of I 6.
